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ARGUMENT 
I: PRlVAi*; PROPERTY IS CONST11 u TIONALLY 
PROTECTED; THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD THAT 
ONLY MINIMAL ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO RETAIN 
THE PRIVATE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE ROADS. 
Wasatch County and the trial court incorrectly viewed the Supreme Court's decision 
as requiring that the landowner perform some act the sole purpose of which was to interrupt 
public use. The issues in this case and the Supreme Court's test must be considered, 
however, in light of the constitutional protections of private property. If the Dedication 
Statute1 were interpreted to allow the public to take private property without just 
'Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006). 
1 
compensation, it would be unconstitutional.2 The statute must be viewed not as a grant, but 
only a rule of evidence to evaluate whether the landowner voluntarily gave or dedicated the 
road to the public.3 As correctly recognized in an early Utah case, before a road "becomes 
public in character the owner of the land must consent to the change."4 
Because intent was not recognized as relevant under the case law in effect at the time 
of the initial trial, Okelberrys moved to reopen to allow evidence directly focused on their 
intent.5 Even the limited evidence that was presented, however, still admits of only one 
conclusion: Okelberrys viewed their land {all their land, including the roads) as private. 
They viewed themselves as having the right to control use of their land (including the roads), 
and acted in accordance with the fact that the land was private. 
Thus, when Ray Okelberry locked the gates to assist in keeping his sheep enclosed, 
although one of his intentions was to control the sheep, it is equally obvious that he intended 
to keep people from opening the gate. He intended to interrupt their use of the road "as a 
public thoroughfare." It was an action, fully consistent only with private property ownership, 
that said, "I am choosing to not allow the public to freely use the road at this time." 
2See U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 22. 
3See Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
"Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (1916). The discussion on 
pages 25-26 of Okelberrys' initial brief establishes that this requirement of intent is still valid 
law in Utah. 
5R. 616-611. 
2 
The trial court's ruling must "should be construed together as a whole so as to give 
meaning and force to all of its terms."6 While the trial court did express that no other witness 
saw Ray Okelberry lock the gates7 and acknowledged Ray's self interest, the court also said, 
"The Court finds that while there may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked 
the gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these were few and far between, were not intended 
to restrict public access, and were not reasonably calculated to interrupt public use of the 
roads."8 This can only be viewed as a finding that Ray Okelberry had locked gates, together 
with a conclusion that the locking was not legally sufficient to meet the Supreme Court's 
standard. The three purported legal defects identified by the trial court, however, reveal a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the test established by the Supreme Court. 
In reviewing the evidence regarding the three purported legal defects, it is important 
to remember the burdens of proof. After stating its new bright-line rule, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
This rule does not change the burden of the party claiming 
dedication. For a highway to be deemed dedicated to the public, 
the party claiming dedication must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the road at issue was continuously 
6Hubble v. Cache County Drainage Dist., 123 Utah 405, 410, 259 P.2d 893, 896 
(1953). 
7Lee Okelberry testified that he didn't lock the gates, but said nothing about whether 
Ray may have done so. Trial Transcript, June 30,2004, at 141. Lee Okelberry operated on 
a different part of the property, and thus had no occasion to go through some of the gates 
locked by Ray Okelberry when the sheep were being moved. Trial Transcript, June 29,2004, 
at 201. His testimony did not contradict the testimony of Ray Okelberry. 
8R. 670. 
3 
used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years; credible 
evidence of the type of interruption defined above—an overt act 
intended to and reasonably calculated to interrupt use of a road 
as a public thoroughfare—simply precludes a finding of 
continuous use.9 
In other words, while Wasatch County had a burden of proving its case by clear and 
convincing evidence, Okelberrys' evidence did not need to meet that standard. The standard 
applicable to Okelberrys' evidence was that it be credible. 
The trial court found the occasions when Ray Okelberry locked the gates were "few 
and far between." All that is required, however, is one instance of blocking every ten years. 
The fact that the gate locking was few and far between does not defeat its legal effect. 
The trial court "found" that the locked gates were not intended to restrict pubic 
access.10 Reading the ruling as a whole, however, reveals that the trial court concluded that 
because the gate was locked only occasionally, and because few if any people were blocked, 
therefore Ray Okelberry must not have intended to restrict public access. Again, the law is 
otherwise. And, there could be no other purpose for locking the gates except to prevent 
public access. Sheep can't tell the difference between a locked gate and one that is merely 
wired shut. The only possible purpose of a lock is to prevent a human from entering. 
"Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 15, 179 P.3d 768. 
10It must be remembered that Okelberrys did not present direct evidence of intent 
because that was not relevant under the case law in effect at the time of trial. See Point III 
below. 
4 
It is apparent the court acknowledged Ray Okelberry had occasionally locked the gates to 
assist in controlling his sheep, but thought there needed to be something more dramatic to 
show "intent" to interrupt public use of the road. 
The trial court also "found" that the locked gates "were not reasonably calculated to 
interrupt public use of the roads."11 Again, it appears the trial court believed there had to be 
some major action that "interrupted public use of the roads generally."12 Okelberrys were 
not required to "construct reinforced fencing" together with "the installation of additional 
physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors"13 along all points of access to the 
property. This was Okelberrys' private property. All that was needed was some sufficient 
action to show their intent to retain that private character, to show that they did not consent 
to it being changed to a public road. If the gates were locked at all, that would have 
interrupted public use of the roads. As demonstrated in Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey,14 it does 
not matter that no one was actually prevented from using the roads. And, the Supreme Court 
in this case emphasized that if the action would have interrupted public use on a heavily 
nR. 670. 
12R.671. 
13Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (8 U.S.C.§ 1103 note), as amended by P.L. 110-161, DivE, Title V, § 564,121 Stat. 
2090, which provides for fencing along parts of the border between the United States and 
Mexico. 
142008UT11, 179P.3d757. 
5 
traveled road, the action would be legally sufficient to interrupt public use on a lightly 
traveled road: 
We emphasize here, however, that the action necessary by the 
landowner to establish an interruption in public use does not 
vary depending on the level of public use. An overt act intended 
and reasonably calculated to interrupt public use restarts the 
statutory period, and the effectiveness of such act is not tied to 
the level of public use. In other words, an act by a landowner 
sufficient to interrupt public use of a road used on a daily basis 
by the public is also sufficient to interrupt public use of a road 
used on a monthly basis by the public.15 
The trial court's statements that Okelberrys' evidence failed to show that they 
"interrupted public use of the roads generally," coupled with the conclusion that "while there 
may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s," these actions were legally insufficient, show that the trial court did not understand 
the minimal nature of the actions necessary to retain the private character of the roads. The 
decision of the trial court must be reversed with instructions to hold that the roads are private. 
II: LEE OKELBERRY INTERRUPTED USE OF THE ROAD AS A 
PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE BY STOPPING PERSONS TO 
JUDGE WHETHER THEIR PURPOSE IN USING THE ROADS 
WAS ACCEPTABLE. 
The trial court summarized Lee Okelberry's testimony as follows: 
He testified that he occasionally he stopped and talked to people 
on Parker Canyon Road in the 1950s.... If there was any that 
needed to go through there in any way, shape or form they could 
Okelberry, *h 17. 
6 
ask or they could go through there. We never turned nobody 
down that had any business down in there.16 
In other words, the trial court found that Lee Okelberry stopped people "on" the roads 
to inquire as to their business, and then let them go through because he approved of their 
purpose in using the roads. Wasatch County asserts that in Utah County v. Butler,17 the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected as insufficient evidence that the landowner has ejected persons from 
the property.18 In Butler, however, the trespasser asked to leave was "hunting well off the 
Road" and was not asked to leave the road itself.19 
There was no requirement that Lee Okelberry actually eject someone. His acts in 
stopping to pass judgment on the purpose of those using the roads interrupted use of the 
roads as a public thoroughfare - somewhere the public had a right to go without interruption. 
No one using a public road would expect to be stopped and questioned by adjoining 
landowners. Lee Okelberry's actions were consistent only with his intent and belief that the 
roads were private and he had a right to stop people and inquire as to their purpose. 
This Court should hold that the actions of Lee Okelberry in stopping people who were 
using the roads constituted an overt act which was intended to and did interrupt use of the 
roads as a public thoroughfare. 
R. 674 \ 14. 
2008UT12, 179P.3d775. 
'Wasatch County brief at 8. 
'2008 UT 12 at U 17. 
7 
Ill: OKELBERRYS ARE ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF INTENT ADDRESSING THE NEW 
TEST ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT; EVIDENCE OF 
CONTROL IS NOT THE SAME AS EVIDENCE OF INTENT. 
Wasatch County asserts as "Okelberrys did their best to try and show that they 
intended to disrupt the use of the roads by the public."20 What Okelberrys did, however, was 
show physical efforts to control or limit public use. There was little or no testimony on the 
intentions behind those actions. 
The trial court based its ruling largely on the lack of testimony concerning subjective 
intent. The trial court rejected Okelberrys5 evidence that they asked people to leave the roads 
because "[n]one of Defendants' witnesses testified that there was a regular policy of 
requiring permission or approval to use the roads during that period, nor that asking persons 
to leave the property was intended to restrict public access to the roads themselves."21 
Addressing the "keep out" and "no trespassing" signs, the trial court said, "Yet none of 
Defendants' witnesses at trial specified their intent when putting up the signs . . . ."22 With 
respect to the locked gates, again the trial court focused on Ray Okelberry's intention, 
concluding that the gates "were not erected or locked with the requisite intent."23 
20Wasatch County brief at 24. 
21R.671. 
21Id. 
23R. 670. 
Okelher * - Jence of their actions, out did not present evidence oi their 
subjective intent m performing those actions. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in this 
case, the cases held that subjective intent was irrelevant Lraki uie Supreme I nini's test, 
as recognized b} the ti ial CCIIII n It, subject e i ntent is nc • < ? < ei } i ele1 ant. 
1 a uuid the trial com t abused its discretion in denying Okelberrys' 
motion for leave to present additional evidence, and remand for a new trial where Okelberrys 
may present that evidence, 
IV: MAINTENANCE O ' 
INTERRUPTION. 
As an additional argument showing that unlocked gates must be treated, as an 
inten uption of public use, Okelberrys argued that a contrary rule would result in the public 
taking i = . ;u u..; . ..,. > s . * «i » • - . . ; 
r i -•• '• ^ n 'ir'* in11" i] - ()keiberrv^ **"ght be requiicu to 
remove those gates.2* This property is used for sheep and cattle, and u^hout gates, the use 
and value of the entire property is impacted. Wasatch County asserts this is a new argument 
understood, however, it is evident that the argument was raised below. 
24See cases and discussion at pages 26-27 of Okelberrys' initial brief See also Clay 
Alger, Comment, Use Interrupted 7At Complicated Evolution of Utah's Highway 
Dedication Doctrine,200%UtdhL. Rev. 1613, 1635 ("thr bright line test brought intent back 
into the analysis"), 
250kelberrys' initial brief at 33-34. 
26Wasatch County brief at 16-17. 
9 
The evidence was unanimous that there have always been gates across these roads. 
In fact, when Okelberry tried to elicit additional evidence on this subject at trial, the judge 
sua sponte stopped the questioning, stating there was no dispute among the witnesses as to 
the location of the gates.27 The court specifically found "there were gates at the entrances 
to each of the roads from 1957 to 2004."28 
Okelberrys argued repeatedly below that the presence of unlocked gates constitutes 
an interruption of public use.29 Okelberrys also argued that the state and federal constitutions 
prohibit taking a road over private property unless the landowner dedicates that road to the 
public. For example, Okelberrys presented the following argument to the trial court: 
The law does not impose on a landowner the duty to protect and 
preserve his own property; rather, the law is supposed to protect 
that property. Only by the clearest of evidence can the law 
justify declaring that the landowner has dedicated a road to the 
public. Although the Supreme Court held that excluding 
members of the public is one way to prevent a road from 
becoming public, it did not hold it was the only way. Consistent 
with the constitutional prohibition of taking private property 
without paying just compensation, the County can prevail only 
if it proves there was "a giving by the landowner rather than a 
taking by the public authority." The cases cited in Okelberry's 
initial memorandum show that the presence of closed gates, 
even if unlocked, negate any inference that Okelberrys "gave" 
their private property to the public.30 
27Transcript June 29, 2004, page 158. 
28R. 673 H 20. 
29
 E.g.,R. 622-621. 
30R. 656 (citations and other footnotes omitted). 
10 
Although Okelbenys did not make the specific argument that forcing the removal of 
the gates will result in the County taking more than Okelbenys gave, Okelbenys clearly did 
argue that the presence of ^iu*cd, uniucrau gates was an interruption of public use and 
prevent the i oads fit: om becoming pi lblic. 
In the recent case of Inner light, Inc. v. Matrix Crony LLi \ u the court considered 
whether an argument had been properly raised bekm I he issue was whether a forum 
selection clause was enforceable, IViai.^ .u,w *.;,..i.* * ^ - ...,a ^iause tx**w by arguing that 
Supreme Court held the issue was nevertheless properly raised: 
On appeal, Matrix argues that the forum selection and choice of 
law provisions of the Contract are enforceable. In so arguing, 
Matrix does not specifically contend that the forum selection 
clause and choice of law provisions are enforceable apart from 
the condition precedent in Section 2 of the Contract. Rather, it 
argues that the forum selection and choice of law provisions are 
enforceable because the condition precedent was fulfilled. 
Although the specific reasoning behind Matrix's conclusion that 
the forum selection and choice of la w provisions are enforceable 
differs from this courts reasoning in reaching the same 
conclusion, the lad remains that the main thrust of Matrix's 
argument is that the forum selection and choice of law 
provisions are enforceable We therefore inid that the 
enforceability ••! the forum selection uid choice of law 
provisions are properly at issue on appeal;32 
This Couii niiuuiu m<m iu<if * JkUberrys proper1 v ..IUSLU <m aspects of their argument 
that tin1 presencen! unlocked jjalescnnslilulesiiii mlrmiphoii Jim! Itial a \ onlian ml* w* uld 
3I?(MW i : r 3 i . 
il 
be unconstitutional because it would result in the County taking more than Okelberrys 
abandoned. 
Wasatch County also argues that to "allow a road that meets the requirements for 
dedication to the public to be somehow limited in scope defeats the purpose of the statute and 
is unworkable."33 This argument assumes that the public somehow has a right to take these 
roads, and that the purpose of the statute is to grant the public a right to "take" roads. As 
argued above,34 the Dedication Statute is not a grant, but only a rale of evidence to evaluate 
whether a landowner has dedicated his or her property to the public. Any other rule would 
result in an unconstitutional taking. While the County would obviously prefer to have roads 
with no gates or other restrictions, the County can use the power of eminent domain to 
remove those restrictions. Absent payment of just compensation, however, the County 
cannot take what the landowner did not give. 
This Court should hold that the constitutional protections of private property require 
that either unlocked gates be considered an interruption, or that the gates be permitted to 
remain even if the road is public. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in again requiring proof that Okelberrys "generally" or 
"regularly" excluded members of the public from the roads. One intentional act every ten 
years is sufficient to preserve private property, regardless of whether anyone's access was 
33
 Wasatch County brief at 5. 
34Pages 1-2. 
12 
(>kclbrrrys, then rniul.s were, tiol "continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of 
ten years." The decision of the trial court should be reversed vv ith instructions to enter 
judgment for Okelberrys. 
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